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HIGHLIGHTS FROM A REPLY TO “HISTORICAL 
CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR POWER 
REACTORS” 
• Lovering et al. (2016) claim to accurately assess nuclear plant costs over time. 
• The authors err by relying on overnight costs, which exclude interest. 
• The authors cherry pick data (e.g, ignoring problems with French nuclear data). 
• The article’s cherry picked data don’t even support the article’s own conclusions. 
• Lovering et al. is not a reliable source for costs of nuclear power. 
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ABSTRACT 
Lovering et al. (2016) present data on the overnight costs of more than half of nuclear 
reactors built worldwide since the beginning of the nuclear age.  The authors claim that 
this consolidated data set offers more accurate insights than previous country-level 
assessments. Unfortunately, the authors make analytical choices that mask nuclear 
power’s real construction costs, cherry pick data, and include misleading data on early 
experimental and demonstration reactors. For those reasons, serious students of such 
issues should look elsewhere for guidance about understanding the true costs of nuclear 
power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the April 2016 issue of Energy Policy, Lovering et al. (2016) present data on the 
overnight costs of 58% of the nuclear reactors built worldwide.  In that article, the 
authors purport to show that using this larger data set yields different and more accurate 
results than analyses that focus on individual countries, explicitly citing Koomey and 
Hultman (2007) for the United States and Grubler (2010) for France as examples of 
country-level treatments. 
Underlying the Lovering et al. analysis is the assumption that including data from 
additional countries must yield a more accurate picture of cost trends for nuclear power.  
Ceteris paribus, that assumption holds, but in this case, all other things are not equal.   
OVERNIGHT COSTS ARE INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING 
A key problem is Lovering et al.’s use of so-called “overnight construction costs”, which 
exclude interest costs that accrue during construction.  Overnight costs have been used in 
the utility industry for decades (EPRI 1993, Rothwell 2015), and they attempt to show a 
cost that is “meant to isolate the cost invariant to construction duration and interest rate, 
in order to capture the cost intrinsic to the reactor technology”, as Lovering et al. put it.   
While overnight costs do have a long history, there is simply no economic basis for 
comparing the costs of reactors without including the cost of capital and the construction 
duration. A key aspect of nuclear reactors that makes them such high-risk investments are 
that they are large scale, complex, and predominantly site-built. Hence construction takes 
years (even in the best case) and can extend over a decade or more.  
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Almost all modern reactor programs analyzed in detail to date have experienced 
significantly lengthened construction times (Sovacool et al. 2014a), which is ignored in 
the use of overnight construction costs by Lovering et al.  Given that financing 
constitutes a significant part of nuclear costs in the real world, and that the very nature of 
nuclear power as a large scale, capital-intensive technology makes it particularly sensitive 
to financial risks, a study that ignores return on capital cannot give a true picture of the 
costs of nuclear power.  
THE DATA PRESENTED REMAIN UNDISCLOSED, ARE CHERRY PICKED, 
AND DON'T SUPPORT THE AUTHORS’ CONCLUSIONS 
Lovering et al.’s conclusions are not reproducible, because the authors have not made 
their data set publicly available. We are unable to verify, for example, whether the data 
from South Korea and India are of the same quality as those for the United States, France, 
and other countries that have been more carefully studied, and won’t be able to do so 
until Lovering et al release their data. 
Lovering et al quote Cour des Comptes (2012) as their data source for French reactor-
specific costs. That study is fraught with data manipulation and arbitrary accounting 
conventions that artificially reduce French nuclear construction costs and their significant 
cost escalation (for a critique see Grubler (2014). 
Instead of reactor-specific cost data, the Cour des Comptes (CdC) study only presents 
pairwise aggregates of reactor construction costs that mask cost heterogeneity. In addition, 
€10 billion of construction-related engineering and labour costs and pre-operating 
charges have been arbitrarily excluded in the CdC cost numbers, artificially lowering 
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 4 
total construction costs by 14 percent and making the French data inconsistent with other 
“overnight” construction cost estimates. In addition, interest during construction reported 
by the French national utility EdF of some €23 billion were arbitrarily reduced to €13 
billion by CdC. The numbers presented by Lovering et al are based on the original CdC 
study, thus underestimating overnight construction costs by €10 billion (€73 billion 
versus €83 billion) and total construction costs by more than 30 percent, or €33 billion 
Euro (€73 billion versus €106 billion).  
In addition, Lovering et al.’s presentation of nuclear costs relative to renewable costs 
omits unfavorable data from their nuclear dataset and favorable data on renewables that 
would indicate more dramatic renewable cost declines (see their Figure 13). That graph 
does not include nuclear cost data from all the countries they studied (leaving out West 
Germany, Canada, and India, which all show cost increases for nuclear power in the 
modern era) and includes only limited data for solar PVs.  The graph omits the earlier 
substantial solar PV cost declines from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (for modules that are 
similar to those now being produced), but also omits the past few years of PV cost 
declines.  The cited source for PV costs, Seel et al. (2014), only covers the years 2000 to 
2012, and PV costs have declined substantially since then (Barbose and Darghouth 2015, 
Bolinger and Seel 2015). The graph also omits wind power, which has shown substantial 
cost declines for many years (Wiser and Bolinger 2015). 
Finally, the overnight costs as presented do not even support the article’s conclusions.  
The abstract states “Our new findings suggest that there is no inherent cost escalation 
trend associated with nuclear technology”.  The article presents graphs for nuclear 
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construction costs in the US, France, Canada, West Germany, Japan, India, and South 
Korea, but the only country where overnight costs appear to decline over time in the 
modern era is South Korea.  In that case the data do not come from an independent source 
but from the country’s nuclear utility, have not been independently audited, and are not 
disclosed (and of course do not include interest during construction, as discussed above). 
As a result, they do not meet the critical scientific criteria of reproducibility and thus 
utmost caution is advisable in drawing strong conclusions from those numbers. 
Lovering et al.’s results suggest one example of overnight costs decreasing in the modern 
era, but the most sensible interpretation of their data is that almost all countries showed 
cost escalation from the 1970s onwards.  This effect would be even more dramatic if the 
authors had included the costs of financing for a full accounting of nuclear construction 
costs and their historical evolution. 
COST DATA FROM THE EARLIEST US REACTORS ARE NOT RELEVANT TO 
MODERN REACTORS 
Lovering et al. include cost data for US demonstration reactors in the 1950s and early 
1960s and for the so-called “turnkey reactors” in the US started 1964 to 1967.  In both 
cohorts, overnight costs show a decline. 
The authors argue that adding these early stage technologies (which were not included in 
the Koomey and Hultman analysis for the US) gives a fuller picture of cost trajectories. 
And indeed, these early examples do appear to show higher overnight costs in the US, 
which would result in a more downward-sloping cost trajectory for US reactors.  
However, the early demonstration reactors are so different in size and technology from 
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later reactors that declines in costs shown in some countries during that period are at best 
only peripherally relevant to analysts trying to understand more recent or contemporary 
cost trends.  Even the turnkey plants have attributes unique to that cohort, so it’s hard to 
know without further study what lessons the cost declines for those reactors hold for 
plants constructed in the modern era. 
Overnight costs for nuclear plants appear to have declined in the 1950s and early 1960s 
for demonstration reactors that were tens of MW or at most a couple of hundred MW in 
size (http://www.nucleartourist.com/basics/early.htm).  Overnight costs also appear to 
have declined for a 600-800 MW reactors purchased under turnkey contracts from 1964 
to 1967.  What do those data tell us about the true costs for building 1000 MW reactors 
after 1970?  Not much, as the utilities in the 1960s and later found out to their chagrin. 
THE AUTHORS AGGREGATE COST DATA IN A MISLEADING WAY  
In addition, the authors have used and applied their dataset in a misleading way. For 
example, they present a figure that aggregates nuclear costs across all countries in their 
Figure 12 and some countries in their Figure 13. This approach is misleading because 
there is not one cost trend (or learning rate) for all nuclear reactors–at best there is a trend 
in each country based on its unique institutional, social, legal, and technological 
context.  The global “experience” with nuclear power is not as relevant as it is for mass-
manufactured energy technologies like solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and wind turbines.  
Lovering et al. make a similar point in their “Conclusions and Policy Recommendations” 
section, but ignore the importance of that point when creating those aggregated graphs: 
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These results show that there is no single or intrinsic learning rate that we should 
expect for nuclear power technology, nor an expected cost trend.  How costs 
evolve over time appears to be dependent on different regional, historical, and 
institutional factors at play.  The large variance we see in cost trends over time 
and across different countries–even with similar nuclear reactor technologies–
suggests that cost drivers other than learning-by-doing have dominated the cost 
experience of nuclear power construction.  Factors such as utility structure, 
reactor size, regulatory regime, and international collaboration may play a larger 
effect (sic).  Therefore, drawing any strong conclusions about future nuclear 
power costs based on one country’s experience –particularly the US experience in 
the 1970s and 1980s–would be ill advised. 
The fact that cost trends for nuclear power are so dependent on these other factors drives 
the differences in country-level experiences. Understanding the drivers for cost trends in 
different countries separately is the only way to glean meaning from these data. Lumping 
the data from different countries together without adjusting for those factors–as Lovering 
et al. do–just muddies the waters and prevents sensible analysis. 
The fundamental difference between site-built and mass-produced technologies is why 
country-specific studies of cost trends still have meaning and resonance for nuclear 
power cost analyses, and why (in part) the costs of mass produced technologies continue 
to fall rapidly around the globe.  Koomey and Hultman (2007) discussed the distinction 
(first raised by Nemet (2007)) of returns to unit scale (as in nuclear reactors) versus 
returns to manufacturing scale (as in solar PV and wind power).   It has become clear in 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 8 
recent years that, at least for the current state of nuclear and renewable technologies, the 
second effect is far more powerful than the first. 
THE ARTICLE MISCHARACTERIZES THE EFFECT OF THREE MILE ISLAND 
ON REACTOR COSTS 
A final issue concerns the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. Lovering et al. state 
Hultman and Koomey (2013) disputed the economic impact of the Three Mile 
Island accident on the US nuclear industry, but failed to observe its distinctive 
effects on overnight construction costs.  These results suggest that the Three Mile 
Island accident in 1979 did uniquely affect the nuclear industry in terms of 
overnight construction cost. 
These two sentences are a complete mischaracterization of what Hultman and Koomey 
wrote. The 2013 article was very clear that TMI was an important event for the industry. 
Its thesis was that the factors that led to the demise of nuclear construction in the United 
States were present and growing before TMI:  
“There can be little doubt that Three Mile Island affected the US nuclear industry, 
public opinion, and regulatory regime. It was, after all, the worst nuclear accident 
in the history of the United States, and even 34 years later remains the third worst 
nuclear accident globally. As such it very well ought to have affected, at a 
minimum, the domestic energy debate in the United States. Nevertheless, laying 
the entire blame for the decline of US nuclear power on the incident is not 
justified. The argument for doing so is superficially plausible, but it is incomplete 
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 9 
and, if taken as the basis for future policies, dangerously misleading. The nation’s 
nuclear industry was in fact facing substantial structural obstacles and economic 
challenges even before the accident, obstacles that reflect the challenging nature 
of nuclear technology in a world of fast-changing competition and fickle demand 
growth.” 
In addition, Koomey and Hultman’s earlier analysis (2007) looked explicitly at costs as a 
function of construction start date, and discussed the effect of TMI.  
We fully agree with Lovering et al. that TMI had impacts on costs, not least via increased 
regulatory requirements, as Koomey and Hultman noted in their original articles. We 
would further add that the accident also affected costs through longer construction 
duration and therefore more costly financing–an aspect that Lovering et al. ignore. But 
we would caution now, as Hultman and Koomey did then, about over-emphasizing the 
effect of TMI, because many other existing headwinds were already changing minds 
about what energy technologies best fit societal electricity needs.  As Hultman and 
Koomey noted in 2013, fully 40 percent of nuclear project cancellations in the United 
States happened before the accident at TMI. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Analyzing the costs of electricity generation technologies is an exercise fraught with 
pitfalls. Unfortunately, Lovering et al.’s assessment of nuclear costs made several 
consequential errors.  Their analysis incorrectly omits interest during construction, and 
thus substantially underestimates the effect of cost escalation over time.  Their article also 
relies on cost data for early US demonstration reactors that are so different from existing 
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reactors in size and technology that they are irrelevant to understanding cost trends of 
modern commercial reactors.  In addition, the Lovering et al. data on reactor costs have 
not been released as supplemental material on the journal’s web site. It is therefore 
impossible to evaluate the quality of these data or what the effect of correcting for 
interest during construction would be. 
We note that the authors cherry pick data to suit their conclusions.  Nevertheless, the 
presented data itself don’t even support their stated conclusions, which is deeply puzzling.  
While Lovering et al claim that their data show a more nuanced picture, suggesting that 
cost escalation for nuclear reactors is not a real problem, their own data for the modern 
era show the contrary. With the exception of South Korea, whose data are not 
independently audited and therefore of unknown quality, all data paint a consistent 
picture: the investment risk of nuclear power is significant, costs almost always increased 
over time in the modern era, and cost overruns and lengthened construction times need to 
be considered carefully by investors and policy makers alike.  Adding interest during 
construction, which Lovering et al. ignore, would only strengthen these conclusions. 
Lovering et al. have also created a superficial and selective comparison with renewable 
technologies (omitting pre-2000 and recent cost declines of PV and omitting costs for 
wind altogether). A consistent picture emerging from most technology costing studies is 
that while trends are variable over time and between countries, mass-manufactured 
renewable technology costs have been decreasing rapidly in recent years, whereas 
individualized on-site-construction based nuclear costs increased in almost all cases in 
the modern era. Even among comparable large-scale on-site-constructed energy 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 11 
technologies, nuclear reactors stand out in terms of frequency and magnitude of cost 
overruns and escalation (Sovacool (2014a, 2014b); see also Gilbert et al.’s rejoinder to 
Lovering et al. in this Issue).   
Better and more transparent data and methods are needed to illuminate critical technology 
investment decisions facing the world, including responding to the challenge of climate 
change. Lovering et al. use analytical methods that mask nuclear power’s real 
construction costs, cherry pick data, and include misleading data on early experimental 
and demonstration reactors. For those reasons, serious students of such issues should look 
elsewhere for guidance about assessing the costs of nuclear power.   
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